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Abstract:	 This	 paper	 investigates	 empirically	 the	 interplay	 between	 participation	 and	
positioning	 in	 global	 value	 chains	 (GVCs),	 employment	 demand	 and	 supply	 and	
workforce’s	skills	endowment.	Results	 touch	upon	the	way	 innovation,	 technology	and	
participation	in	GVCs	shape	employment	in	routine	intensive	and	non-routine	jobs;	the	
relationship	between	participation	in	GVCs	and	polarisation	of	employment;	the	way	the	
skill	composition	of	a	country’s	workforce	–	both	the	type	of	skills	and	their	distribution	
–	 shapes	 specialisation	 and	 positioning	 along	 GVCs;	 and	 the	 complementarities	
emerging	 between	 GVC	 participation	 and	 investment	 in	 knowledge-based	 capital,	
especially	organisational	capital	and	ICT.	
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1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, the world has witnessed an ever growing 
movement of capital, intermediate inputs, final goods and people. 
Technological progress, innovation, and trade and investment 
liberalisation, among others, have led to an operational and geographical 
unbundling of production which makes it possible to produce and 
assemble parts of goods and services in distant locations, often 
geographically clustered at the local and regional level (Baldwin, 2012). 
Such fragmented production patterns happening in the context of greater 
international economic integration are generally termed global value 
chains (GVC), to emphasise the value added generated over the 
production chain.  
GVCs contribute to make an efficient use of a country’s resources by 
exchanging its goods and services for those that a counterpart produces 
relatively more efficiently, and ultimately shape countries’ (regions’) 
economic growth and welfare. At the same time as production becomes 
progressively unbundled across borders, countries and regions become 
economically more integrated through complex networks of investment, 
products and human capital. These affect productivity and the efficient 
allocation of inputs; the demand for skills and the skill composition of the 
workforce; the generation, diffusion and adoption of technologies; and the 
income of households. These dynamic gains from trade strengthen the 
argument that trade reflecting the comparative advantage is not a 
zero-sum game. 
While being potentially able to benefit all parties involved, GVCs often 
lead to gains that are unevenly distributed within and across countries. 
Market failures including rigid labour and product markets, credit market 
imperfections, and knowledge and networks externalities, may interfere 
with the appropriation of the overall gains. Also, interconnectedness and 
the increased volatility and uncertainty that may come with it, may affect 
some parts of the population more than others, and change the quality 
and allocation of production inputs. Increased access to global markets, 
also by developing countries, has greatly expanded the global workforce, 
making it more convenient for producers in developed countries to 
outsource or offshore part of the production. Similarly, producers in 
OECD countries have been facing increasing competition on final product 
markets, due to imports from an ever greater set of producing countries. 
Both patterns are likely to have contributed to employment polarisation 
(e.g. Goos et al., 2014), general downward pressure on wages, especially of 
unskilled workers, and the observed decline in manufacturing 
employment in OECD countries (e.g. Ebenstein et al., 2014; Autor et al., 
2016; Keller and Utar, 2016). 
While these distributive outcomes can result out of complex 
phenomena that unfold independently on trade, including limited social 
and geographical mobility, low growth, or technological change, public 
scepticism about the possible benefits of trade and globalisation has been 
growing. Despite the fact that inequalities have been increasing in the 
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context of a sizeable slowdown of global trade growth in recent years 
(ECB, 2016; Haugh et al., 2016), a recent survey (Pew Research Center, 
2014) carried out across 44 countries highlighted that a significant number 
of people in OECD countries felt left behind by globalisation. While 
median respondents in advanced nations thought that trade was good for 
their countries (84% agree), they also believed that globalisation hardly 
increased employment (44% agree) or wages (25%). Several studies further 
correlate discontent towards trade to increased support in populist or 
protectionist parties (Dippel et al., 2015; Autor et al., 2016; Colantone and 
Stanig, 2016; Malgouyres, 2016; Jensen et al., 2018). 
Allowing citizens to benefit from the opportunities that globalisation 
offers therefore requires integrated policy approaches. This on the one 
hand entails creating the right conditions for the potential benefits of 
openness and interconnectedness to materialise, for instance through 
investment in education and innovative capabilities or improvements in 
credit and labour markets. On the other hand, mechanisms aimed at 
redistributing the gains of globalisation to those who are left behind and 
whose jobs and lives are disrupted by it should be devised. This may 
mean, for instance, providing people with the ‘right’ set of skills, 
supporting income in job-to-job transitions, and strengthening social 
safety nets. While the present study does not offer evidence on the role of 
policies explicitly, it nevertheless suggests a number of measures which 
could affect the economic relationships analysed empirically. 
The work carried out in the context of the OECD GVCs, Jobs and Skills 
project 1  has contributed to shed light on these issues, by providing 
evidence about the effect of GVC participation on jobs and employment, 
and the way workforce skills shape countries' participation in GVC. This 
article highlights some of the policy implications related to the way in 
which innovation, technology and GVC participation shape employment 
in routine intensive and non-routine jobs; and the relationship between 
participation in GVCs and the polarisation of employment, i.e. a situation 
in which one observes job losses in the middle of the wage or skill 
distribution and job gains at the extremes of these distributions. The note 
further addresses how the skill composition of a country's workforce - 
both the type of skills and their distribution - shapes specialisation and 
positioning along the global value chain. Finally, the way in which GVC 
specialisation and positioning both determine and are determined by 
investment in selected knowledge-based capital (KBC, also known as 
intangible) assets, and what this entails for policy will be discussed. 
                                                
1 The “GVCs, jobs and skills” project was carried out by the Directorate for Science, 
Technology and Innovation (STI) in collaboration with the Directorate for Education 
and Skills (EDU), the Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Directorate (ELS) and 
the Trade and Agriculture Directorate (TAD). 
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2 How Many and Which Jobs in GVCs? 
The rapid pace of growth of trade of the last three decades saw an 
increasing participation of developing countries in global exports. While 
in the 1990s North-South trade represented a limited proportion of global 
trade, this is no longer the case. For the EU15, for instance, the proportion 
of North-North imports in total imports of manufactured goods (including 
intra-EU trade) declined from 91% in 1990 to 71% in 2015 (Crozet and 
Orefice, 2017). Trade with low-wage countries, coupled with the diffusion 
of labour-saving technologies, is considered one of the drivers of the 
current restructuring of employment across occupations and sectors in 
OECD countries, and of the historical decline of manufacturing 
employment. 
To shed light on the way in which GVC participation shapes 
employment levels and distribution two complementary analyses have 
been carried out. The first assesses the importance of GVC trade on jobs of 
different routine intensity (Marcolin et al., 2016 and 2018a). The second 
revisits the import competition hypothesis and existing evidence related to 
the so-called polarisation of the labour market (Breemersch et al., 2017). 
Employment polarisation is characterised by employment loss in the 
middle of the wage or skill distribution and by increases in employment 
levels at the extremes of these distributions (see e.g. Autor et al., 2003; 
Goos et al., 2014). It emerges from differences in the complementarity of 
labour-saving technologies with mid-skilled employment (negative 
complementarity) and skilled employment (positive complementarity), 
and a positive complementarity between employment at the top and 
bottom of the skill distribution. 
2.1 The Trade and Jobs Nexus in the Literature 
In the ‘90s many studies explored the consequences of competition 
from developing countries on employment and wage inequality in 
developed countries. They posited that, if imports from developing 
countries concentrate in industries intensive in unskilled labour, import 
competition may negatively affect the wages of unskilled workers relative 
to skilled workers in developed countries and, through this income effect, 
raise the employability of unskilled workers. The evidence collected in the 
1990s and early 2000s, however, supported the idea that job losses in 
manufacturing were rather linked to technological advancements and 
reduced labour demand in manufacturing, rather than trade (e.g. Berman 
et al., 1994; 1998). Skill-complementary technological progress in the form 
of computerisation increased wage inequality and skill intensity.  
A separate set of studies focusing on offshoring of intermediate inputs 
linked changes in trade to employment or wages. It was argued that when 
production of low-skill or low-wage intensive intermediate inputs is 
relatively cheaper in developing countries, developed countries’ firms 
outsource the production of low-skilled-intensive goods to developing 
countries, thus freeing resources to hire further skilled workers at home. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999), for instance, found that computerisation 
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affected demand for skilled labour in the US in the 1990s more strongly 
than offshoring, but that both channels were active. Grossmann and 
Helpman (2008) further proposed to divide production in a continuum of 
tasks (rather than products), and argued that the more routine intensive 
tasks would be offshored. The analysis here below embraces this 
task-based perspective of production, whereby final goods are assembled 
from a number of separable intermediate products or tasks which can be 
produced or carried out in different countries, sequentially or 
simultaneously. 
The surge of Chinese exports during the 2000s motivated a third group 
of analyses which tested the conclusions of studies focused on the labour 
market outcomes of technology and trade. They found evidence about 
import competition from the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China)  
having a sizable negative effect on the labour market of developed 
countries (e.g. Ebenstein et al., 2014; Autor et al., 2013; Autor et al., 2016). 
Also, it was found that GVCs have become more capital and high-skill 
intensive after 2001, when freer access to the Chinese market allowed for 
important capital inflows into the country and accelerated the erosion of 
developed economies’ comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
production (Timmer et al., 2014). These studies generally allow the impact 
of Chinese trade to originate both from increased competition on the final 
goods market, and by offshoring of intermediate good production to 
China. 
2.2 Routine Jobs and Technology 
Marcolin et al. (2018s) develop new indicators of the routine intensity of 
occupations based on information from the OECD Programme for the 
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). These 
measures capture individual workers’ degree of independence in planning 
and organising their activities and time, as well as their freedom in 
deciding what to do on the job and in what sequence. They further 
distinguish between the tasks workers do on their jobs and the skills they 
are endowed with. Statistics based on these indicators shed light on the 
extent to which average industry intensity in routine tasks differs across 
countries (Figure 1). While routine-intensive jobs are generally associated 
with relatively lower skill levels, yet, there exist skilled workers who carry 
out routine jobs (e.g. medical imaging technicians), which can be affected 
by automation and relocation in the same way as low skill routine workers 
can. 
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Figure	 1.	 Percentage	 of	 Employment,	 by	 routine	 intensity.	 All	 PIAAC	 countries,	
2011-2012 
	
Source:	Marcolin	et	al.	(2018a)	based	on	PIAAC	data.	
 
Marcolin et al. (2016) further explore the extent to which employment 
levels of different routine jobs are shaped by industrial structure, 
technology and innovation capabilities, workforce skills and participation 
in GVCs. The analysis, which encompasses 27 European countries and the 
U.S. over 2000-2011 explores several trade in value-added (TiVA) patterns, 
including offshoring of inputs, domestic outsourcing, and offshoring of 
final assembly activities. 
The results suggest the existence of complex interactions: a higher ICT 
intensity of industries is positively associated with employment, except 
for high-routine jobs, where ICTs seemingly displace workers (Figure 2). 
Conversely, technological intensity in the form of innovation output (i.e. 
patents), is found to relate positively to jobs of any routine intensity. 
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Figure	2.	Employment	levels	and	ICT	intensity:	controlled	correlations	
 
Note:	The	X-axis	displays	the	share	of	employees	in	ICT	occupations	over	total	employment	in	the	
country-industry-pair.	 The	 Y-axis	 shows	 the	 log-employment	 by	 routine	 intensity	 in	 each	
country-industry	 pair.	 All	 other	 factors	 included	 in	 the	 econometric	 analysis	 in	Marcolin	 et	 al.	
(2016)	are	controlled	for.	Dots	correspond	to	the	residual	of	an	OLS	regression	of	the	actual	value	
on	 all	 other	 explanatory	 variables	 included	 in	 the	 analysis,	 except	 for	 the	 one	 plotted	 on	 the	
X-axis.	
Source:	 Marcolin	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 based	 on	 European	 Labour	 Force	 Survey	 and	 U.S.	 Current	
Population	Survey	data.	
 
GVCs generally do not seem to displace routine workers, especially in 
manufacturing, where input offshoring and domestic outsourcing are 
positively associated with routine employment. The opposite is conversely 
observed in the case of offshoring of final assembly and outsourcing of 
service inputs. Also, in manufacturing, the presence of large firms is 
positively associated with employment in routine occupations. More 
generally, industry structure seems to matter and so do economies of scale 
when competing in global markets: small is not always beautiful, and 
competition, while likely to improve allocation of resources and aggregate 
productivity, can bring about important job losses and lead to significant 
adjustment costs. Finally, while generally positively associated with 
employment, the role played by higher-level skills differs in 
manufacturing and services industries. While Marcolin et al. (2016) 
explore these complex relationships and their intuition in greater detail, it 
remains generally true that GVCs play a minor role in the dynamics of 
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employment by routine type relative to other industry-level features and 
to technology in particular. 
2.3 Labour Market Polarisation 
The concept of routine tasks gained importance when Autor et al. (2003) 
highlighted that computerisation may have facilitated the automation of 
routine tasks and the progressively polarisation of labour markets in 
developed countries. Polarisation takes the form of job growth in 
relatively high-skill, high-wage jobs and low-skill, low-wage jobs. While 
job polarisation was first attributed to skill-biased technological change 
(Autor and Katz, 1999), recent work has shifted the focus towards the 
offshoring of routine tasks (Oldenski, 2014), or to Chinese import 
competition (Autor et al., 2013; Keller and Utar, 2016)2. 
Breemersch et al. (2017) explore the role of all the mentioned channels 
in determining labour market polarisation in 19 European countries, 
between 1996-2007. Departing from most existing studies, the authors (i) 
explore both manufacturing and service employment; (ii) exploit measures 
of trade in value added; and (iii) look at the role of labour market 
institutions in mediating the impact of both technological progress and 
GVCs in employment polarisation. 
Cross-country results suggest that while employment polarisation can 
be found in most countries covered by the study, differences emerge in the 
magnitude of the phenomenon. Also, in some countries, a decrease of 
low-paying occupations can be observed. Within countries, polarisation is 
found to have increased in almost all industries, and more so in business 
services than manufacturing. Increases in polarisation at the country level 
are thus the result of polarisation within individually considered 
industries and of changes in employment away from industries that are 
initially not-so-polarised to industries that are more polarised. 
Figure 3 highlights that the within-industry component is the most 
important contributor to overall polarisation. On average, it explains 68%, 
or 4.3 of the 6.3 percentage-point increase of employment in top and 
bottom (by wage) occupations in European countries. Manufacturing and 
wholesale and retail trade seem to drive the within-components, while the 
between-industry components are linked to employment being reallocated 
away from manufacturing to business services and also to health and 
social work. 
 
                                                
2 The project left the exploration of wage dynamics (in the spirit of e.g. Ebenstein et al., 
2014; Autor, 2015) to future research.   
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Figure	3.	Within/between-sector	decomposition	of	polarisation	
 
Source:	Breemersch	et	al.	(2017)	based	on	European	Labour	Force	Survey.	
	
The analysis in Breemersch et al. (2017) suggests technological change 
to be once again the main driver of employment changes, and of 
within-industry polarisation in particular. Import competition from China 
is negatively but weakly correlated with polarisation in manufacturing. 
The same applies between offshoring of value added and polarisation in 
non-manufacturing industries. Somewhat surprisingly, labour market 
institutions contribute marginally to explain the different employment 
polarisation patterns emerged across countries. However, this may not be 
the case for wage polarisation, which remains outside the scope of the 
study. 
In sum, both Marcolin et al. (2016) and Breemersch et al. (2017) align 
with existing evidence and find offshoring and trade to only play a limited 
role in shaping employment in OECD countries. It is changes in the 
technological endowment of the sector(s) and country(s) which are more 
significantly associated with changes in employment. 
While important and robust, these conclusions need to be qualified by 
some caveats, given that both analyses do not take into account three 
aspects of trade, technological change and employment dynamics. First, 
GVCs can have an impact on employment dynamics through 
technological change, to the extent that high tech foreign intermediate and 
final goods can penetrate the domestic economy through international 
trade. Second, the role of technological change and innovation is bound to 
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stronger role of technology, once the deployment of the latest 
labour-saving technologies is completed. Lastly, both changes in GVC 
participation and technology, especially if combined with good 
managerial practices, can improve within industry (firm) productivity and 
across-industry (firm) allocative efficiency, which in turn could free 
resources to hire new workers in the economy or industry. The studies 
above do not disentangle the direct employment creation or destruction 
effect of trade and technology from the general equilibrium positive effect 
on job creation discussed above.   
2.4 Trade in Employment 
A positive impact of GVCs on employment can be generated when 
firms scale up following an expansion in export markets. However, 
empirical evidence (e.g. Hoeckman and Winters, 2005) has thus far found 
little support for this so-called Heckscher-Ohlin prediction (Heckscher et 
al., 1991), whereby trade would redistribute employment away from 
import-substituting towards export-oriented productions, independently 
of changes in productivity. Most of the gains from trade to employment 
seem to manifest in higher productivity and economic growth, similar to 
what was mentioned in the previous section. 
Independent of the channel, it is possible to estimate the share of 
domestic jobs used in production to satisfy foreign demand for final goods 
and services. Based on the Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Database, 
the OECD has developed indicators providing insights into the origins of 
demand for a country’s employment. The Trade in Employment Database 
offers employment by industry data for all OECD, EU28 countries and 
G20 countries. To produce measures of jobs sustained by foreign final 
demand it is assumed that foreign demand is satisfied by workers that use 
a proportion of their working time which is the same as the share of 
foreign demand in an industry’s total output. For example, if one third of 
the output of a given industry is consumed abroad, then it is assumed that 
workers in that industry use one third of their time to sustain foreign final 
demand3. The numbers are important. For the last available year in the 
dataset, 2011, foreign demand sustained as many as 106.6 million workers 
over all OECD countries (61 million jobs in the EU28) in all sectors of the 
economy, of which 31.5 million in manufacturing (18.5 million in the 
EU28)4. Figure 4 shows the same numbers, but as a percentage of a 
country’s or an industry’s total employment, averaged over all countries 
in the macro-area. Foreign final demand is more important for 
                                                
3 Changes in the number of jobs sustained by final demand therefore reflect the 
fluctuation in demand, and do not necessarily imply changes in the total number of 
workers effectively employed in the industry of interest. 
4 Foreign final demand includes all countries but the one in consideration. For example, 
foreign demand for Austrian employment encompasses demand from any other 
country which is not Austria, including other European ones.   
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manufacturing employment than for total economy employment, 
consistent with the higher trade propensity of the manufacturing sector. It 
is also more important for the average European country (56.6% of total 
economy employment) than for the average OECD (53.7%) or G20 (35.6%) 
country. This dependency on foreign demand varies across countries, but 
it is less important for G20 countries than for the EU28 or the OECD. 
As mentioned, the long term decline in manufacturing jobs in OECD 
countries has multiple causes. One of them is the decline in demand for 
manufacturing goods at home and from abroad, both in terms of direct 
demand for final manufacturing goods and of demand for intermediate 
goods embodied in the production of other sectors. 
  
Figure	4.	Jobs	sustained	by	foreign	final	demand,	as	a	percentage	of	total	employment	
in	 the	 industry	 or	 economy	 (Average	 value	 of	 country-specific	 percentages,	 for	 all	
countries	in	the	macro-area,	2011)	 	 	 	 	
 
Note:	OECD	Trade	in	Employment	database,	accessed	March	2017.	Total	stands	for	all	sectors	in	
the	 economy	 excluding	 household	 production,	Manuf	 for	 sectors	 ISIC	 rev.3	 number	 15	 to	 37.	
Mean	 is	 calculated	 as	 unweighted	 average	 across	 the	 percentages	 of	 all	 countries	 in	 the	
macro-area	 of	 interest.	 The	 category	 G20	 non-OECD	 includes	 Argentina,	 Brazil,	 China,	 India,	
Indonesia,	the	Russian	Federation,	Saudi	Arabia	and	South	Africa.	EU28	and	OECD	have	the	same	
maximum	and	minimum	values,	which	are	the	percentages	for	Luxembourg.	 	
Source:	Authors’	calculations	on	OECD	Trade	in	Employment	database.	
 
Figure 5 shows a decomposition of year-on-year changes in 
employment in manufacturing based on the origin of final demand for 
goods and services across different countries. For example, during the 
financial crisis which hit South-East Asia in 1997, net employment growth 
in the OECD was almost zero. However, this number was the result of an 
increase of about 2.6 million jobs created to meet demand in the European 
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Union and the United States, and of a loss of about 2.5 million jobs due to 
lower demand for OECD-produced manufacturing goods from Southeast 
Asian countries (excluding China). In the same period covered by Figure 5 
(1995-2011), over all OECD countries, manufacturing employment as a 
percentage of total employment decreased from 17.5% to 12.4%. 
 
Figure	5.	Origin	of	demand	for	manufacturing	jobs	in	OECD,	annual	changes	by	region	
of	demand,	1995-2011	
 
Note:	 East	 and	 Southeast	 Asia	 (excluding	 China)	 comprises	 Brunei	 Darussalam,	 Cambodia,	
Indonesia,	 Hong	 Kong	 (China),	 Japan,	 Korea,	 Malaysia,	 Philippines,	 Singapore,	 Chinese	 Taipei,	
Thailand	and	Viet	Nam.	
Source:	 OECD	 STI	 Scoreboard	 2015,	 based	 on	 Inter-Country	 Input-Output	 (ICIO)	 Database,	
Structural	 Analysis	 (STAN)	 Database,	 Annual	 National	 Accounts	 Database,	 and	 World	
Input-Output	Database	(WIOD).	
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are therefore needed to boost economic performance and minimise the 
cost of employment reallocation related to GVC participation. These 
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approaches encompass industrial, innovation, labour, trade and skills 
policies. 
Employment losses in manufacturing do not need to entail a net loss of 
employment for the economy as a whole, as lower manufacturing 
employment may be compensated by higher employment in services 
industries. The progressive servitisation of economies and the possible 
important productivity gains created by it need to be taken into account 
when designing effective policies. 
The positive correlation of innovation with employment, and generally 
more so in the case of non-routine and low routine intensive occupations, 
argues in favour of policies supporting investment in innovation-related 
activities, and calls for the need to design broad-based innovation policies 
able to foster productivity and growth (OECD, 2015b). Among these 
policies, special attention could be given to the funding of research and 
the strengthening of research collaborations between universities and 
firms and between firms. 
ICT-related capabilities appear to be positively correlated with 
employment of all routine intensities, except for high-routine workers. 
While it is unlikely that any policy may be able (or may want to) influence 
the routine-intensity and computerisation of employment, targeted skill 
policies can help sustain employability, especially if the ICT capabilities of 
workers are called into cause. This last point is discussed in more detail in 
the next session. 
Policies affecting firm creation and scaling up processes would need to 
be carefully designed, too, as they may shape employment in opposite 
directions, depending on the concerned occupations and industries. For 
instance, in Marcolin et al. (2016), the presence of big firms in 
manufacturing correlates positively with higher employment of routine 
workers, whereas this is not the case in services. Hence, scaling up policies 
might have differential effects on aggregate employment levels depending 
on the structure of the economy. At the same time, small firms contribute 
to overall job creation mostly when they are young, although only a 
fraction of start-ups actually participate to job creation (Calvino et al., 
2015). As it is likely that cross-country differences in start-up birth and 
growth rates are related to the possibility for these firms to experiment 
with new business models and grow or die away, successful policies 
should target the efficiency of the judiciary, contract enforcement, or the 
penalties associated to bankruptcies. 
Lastly, well-functioning labour market institutions are fundamental to 
strike the right balance between employment flexibility and aggregate 
welfare, and to smooth the reallocation of the labour force according to the 
patterns of GVCs. Active labour market policies should address the match 
between workers and firms, and allow for a smooth transition between 
occupations and sectors, as well as between self-employment and salaried 
employment. Important tools in this sense are policies supporting 
workforce training, which will be discussed more extensively in the next 
session. Countries may also need to update their social protection systems, 
if entitlements are to be made portable from job to job, or if minimum 
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levels of employment protection are to be established for all workers. 
Finally, changes in the relative bargaining power of workers and 
employers can influence employment flows, as bargaining power is key 
for the distribution of the gains from international fragmentation of 
production to workers (e.g. Budd and Slaughter, 2004; Carluccio et al., 
2015). 
3 GVCs and Skills 
The studies summarised in this section propose new skills indicators 
aimed at capturing workers’ capabilities and the use of their skills on the 
job. Furthermore, these studies investigate the relationship between skills 
and different forms of GVC participation, a link which has never been 
empirically assessed before, given that past studies defined trade in gross 
rather than value-added terms. 
3.1 The Trade and Skills Nexus in the Literature 
Value chains’ production of high-income countries has become more 
capital and high-skill intensive after 2001 (e.g. Timmer et al., 2014). While 
the share of value added accounted for by labour marginally decreased (in 
favour of capital), this was driven by a major decline in the share of low- 
and medium-skill labour. As a consequence, developed countries have 
been specialising in high-skill intensive activities in the value chain.  
Such outcomes can be the result of complex mechanisms of mutual 
feedback between GVCs and skills. On the one hand, high-skilled human 
capital is expected to carry out complex tasks, which should lead to better 
economic performance, either directly or through complementarity with 
technology (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Skills increase the capacity to 
develop and absorb technology and knowledge more broadly, and to 
better monitor the quality and the organisation of production. On the 
other hand, GVCs increase the level of competition in the industry or 
country, thus raising the quality and productivity requirements of 
production within firms, and possibly the skill endowment of the 
workforce as a consequence. In Helpman et al. (2017), more productive 
firms are also able to better screen the potential new employees, thus 
hiring more skilled workers. 
The process of knowledge diffusion across borders and sectors further 
requires that the workforce upgrades its knowledge stock continuously. 
Within-firm skill intensity in OECD countries may also increase as a 
consequence of the offshoring of unskilled labour -intensive tasks to 
low-income countries. Lastly, the stronger competition caused by GVC 
participation, may force the least productive firms out of the market; if 
those that remain are not only the more productive but also the most skill 
intensive companies, the average skill intensity of the industry and 
country is bound to increase. 
The complex patterns characterising the relationships between skill 
endowment, tasks performed on the job, and GVCs have thus far been 
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explored by only a relatively small number of studies. Furthermore, in 
these studies, skills are normally measured using information on the 
educational attainment of the workforce or on the basis of the 
occupational title of workers. Ingram and Neumann (2006) and Poletaev 
and Robinson (2008), among others, maintain that both these proxies do 
not measure skills adequately, at least as far as wage analysis is concerned. 
3.2 A New Characterisation of Skills 
Grundke et al., 2017a exploit data from the Survey of Adult Skills 
(PIAAC) to propose a number of indicators capturing workers’ cognitive 
skills, personality traits and skills as they emerge from the tasks 
performed on the job. These indicators are exploited in a descriptive 
analysis of the skill intensity of industries and occupations as well as in a 
regression analysis that investigates the relationship between industries’ 
skill intensities, labour productivity, and industries’ participation in 
GVCs. The paper describes the economic importance of all these different 
types of skills, which had never been taken into consideration before in 
their complexity in a single analysis of industry performance. 
The analysis relies on data for 31 countries and on information both 
gathered through administered tests and reported by individuals about 
their work and the tasks performed on the job. Previous analyses 
conversely relied on information collected by U.S. job specialists contained 
in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (and its successor O’Net) (Ingram 
and Neumann, 2006, and Poletaev and Robinson, 2008). Most relevantly, 
Grundke et al. (2017a) exploratory factor analysis à la Conti et al. (2014) 
extracts six task-based skill indicators capturing the skills that are key for 
performance on the job and for firm performance. These skill indicators, 
which are clearer to interpret and sharper to distinguish from each other 
than the ones identified by previous studies, relate to: information and 
communication technologies (ICT) skills; readiness to learn and creative problem 
solving; managing and communication; self-organisation; marketing and 
accounting; and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM)–
quantitative skills. 
Figure 6 offers an example of the differences that emerge in the skill 
endowment of the workforce. It plots the minimum, average and 
maximum value of ICT skills in the considered occupation and macro- 
sector (manufacturing in dark grey, services in light grey) across countries. 
While, as expected, high-skill occupations display higher average ICT 
skills than low-skill occupations, median and maximum values for 
high-skill occupations are very close, suggesting that a few countries 
display (on average, across all individuals in the sub-sample) significantly 
low skill intensity. This is important, as differences in ICT skills are found 
to play a role in the ability of countries to participate in GVCs. Grundke et 
al. (2017a) provide a more extensive characterisation of the distribution of 
skills by age, gender and size of the firm where the individual works. 
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Figure	 6.	 ICT	 skills	 by	 occupation,	 2011	 (Dispersion	 of	 country-industry	 averages	 by	
occupation)	 	 	 	
 
Note:	Figures	are	based	on	country	and	sector	specific	averages,	by	occupational	category.	Each	
bar	shows	the	country	exhibiting	the	minimum	and	maximum	country-sector-occupation	value,	
as	an	average	over	all	individuals	in	the	country-sector-occupation	cell.	The	sample	for	this	graph	
includes	 the	 following	 23	 countries	 from	 the	 first	 round	 of	 PIAAC:	 Australia,	 Austria,	 Belgium	
(Flanders),	 Canada,	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Germany,	 Denmark,	 Estonia,	 Finland,	 France,	 Ireland,	
Italy,	Japan,	Korea,	the	Netherlands,	Norway,	Poland,	the	Russian	Federation	(excluding	Moscow),	
the	 Slovak	 Republic,	 Spain,	 Sweden,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (England	 and	 Northern	 Ireland),	 the	
United	States.	Country-industry	cells	having	 less	 than	25	observations	 in	PIAAC	are	excluded	to	
reduce	measurement	error.	 	
Source:	Grundke	et	al.	(2017a)	based	on	PIAAC	dataset.	
3.3 Skills, Productivity and Trade Specialisation 
Heterogeneity in skill distributions across countries and industries 
contributes to explain differences in economic performance and trade 
patterns. One of the contributions of this work is to specify which skills 
matter, and thus to add further elements to existing studies agreeing on 
the importance of skills for economic outcomes. Figure 7a proposes a 
preliminary answer to this question in the form of controlled correlations 
between average skills and labour productivity, at the country-industry 
level. More precisely, it plots the change in labour productivity 
corresponding to a 1% increase in average workers’ skills for a sample of 
18 manufacturing and service industries in 31 OECD and non-OECD 
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countries5. The correlations control for a number of industry characteristics 
(see bottom of Figure 7a) and are driven by cross-industry differences in 
skill endowments.  
 Industries with a higher mean in any skill but self-organisation 
display higher productivity, coherently with the idea that more skilled 
workers are fast learners and can perform their working tasks better6. This 
association is much stronger for the assessed cognitive skills (literacy, 
numeracy and problem solving) than for task-based skills. It is partly 
driven by a compositional effect (not all industries require ICT, STEM or 
marketing and accounting skills equally to raise efficiency, contrary to 
cognitive skills), but also suggests that firms cannot operate efficiently if 
workers are missing the fundamental skills to understand, analyse and 
solve problems. Furthermore, the results indicate that industries 
specialising in specific tasks and requiring the corresponding task-based 
skills more intensively are also more productive than other industries. 
                                                
5 For the analysis, all 31 countries from the first and the second round of PIAAC are 
included. Data correspond to the years 2011-12 for the first round of PIAAC and to the 
2014-15 for the second round. Furthermore, as TiVA data are not available beyond the 
year 2011, productivity and trade in value added data for 2011 are used also for the 
countries from the second round of PIAAC. In robustness checks, where second round 
countries are excluded, inference from the estimations is preserved. 
6 Other aspects of the economy may be driving this relationship. It could be the case 
that only the high-skill intensive and high productive firms can survive competition 
on the output market, thus increasing in size and driving both average skill intensity 
and productivity in the sector. It is also possible that more productive firms attract 
more skilled workers, or are better able to screen workers at the moment of hiring 
(Helpman et al., 2017). Lacking firm-level information on workers’ skills, these 
distinctions cannot be made in Grundke et al. (2017a). 
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Figure	 7a.	 Correlations	 between	 skills	 and	 productivity.	 PIAAC	 countries,	 2011	 and	
2014	
 
Note:	The	dependent	variable	is	the	log	of	labour	productivity	in	the	TiVA18	sector	for	the	year	
2011,	measured	 as	 value	 added	 per	 employee.	 All	 specifications	 are	 estimated	 using	 OLS	 and	
include	dummies	for	countries	as	well	as	country-industry	control	variables	(skill	intensity,	capital	
intensity	and	R&D	expenditure).	Each	skill	indicator	enters	alone	in	each	separate	regression,	and	
is	measured	as	the	logarithm	of	the	average	skill	value	among	workers	in	the	country-industry	of	
reference.	The	sample	includes	the	same	countries	as	in	Figure	6,	which	were	surveyed	between	
2011	and	2012,	but	 also	Chile,	Greece,	 Israel,	 Lithuania,	New	Zealand,	 Singapore,	 Slovenia	and	
Turkey,	which	were	surveyed	between	2014	and	2015.	Country-industry	cells	having	less	than	25	
observations	in	PIAAC	are	excluded	to	reduce	measurement	error.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	
at	the	country	level.	A	missing	value	indicates	that	the	regression	coefficient	is	insignificant	at	5%	
confidence	level.	 	 	 	
Source:	Grundke	et	al.	(2017a)	based	on	OECD	PIAAC,	TiVA,	SNA,	ANBERD	data,	and	WIOD.	
	
Figure 7b instead provides a set of correlations between average 
industry skills and exports in gross and value added terms as well as 
forward linkages in GVCs (that is, the value added produced in the home 
country-industry and exported and consumed abroad). The estimation 
uses a bilateral country-industry gravity model (e.g. Chor, 2010), whereby 
trade is explained by physical capital intensity, skill intensity, and R&D 
expenditure as before, as well as measures of barriers to trade (distance, 
contiguity, common language, common coloniser, past and current 
colonial links and being the same country), the size of the two trading 
countries’ industries, and a set of country and partner country dummies 
(see Grundke et al, 2017a, for more details on the estimation strategy). 
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When workers have higher cognitive, ICT or STEM skills, and stronger 
readiness to learn, countries add more value to exports and participate 
more in GVCs by specialising in industries that require these skills more 
intensively. This is also true for managing and communication as well as 
marketing and accounting skills, but only when trade is measured in value 
added terms and taking into account indirect exports.  
 
Figure	7b.	Correlations	between	Skills	and	Participation	in	GVCs.	PIAAC	Countries,	2011	
and	2014	
 
Note:	All	dependent	variables	are	measured	for	industry	k	in	home	country	i	and	partner	country	j	
for	 the	 year	 2011,	 and	 expressed	 in	 logarithms.	All	 specifications	 are	 estimated	using	OLS	 and	
include	dummies	for	countries	as	well	as	country-industry	control	variables	(skill	intensity,	capital	
intensity	 and	 R&D	 expenditure),	 bilateral	 trade	 cost	 variables,	 and	 proxies	 for	 the	 size	 of	 the	
home	and	foreign	country-industry.	Each	skill	indicator	enters	alone	in	each	separate	regression,	
and	 is	 measured	 as	 the	 logarithm	 of	 the	 average	 skill	 value	 among	 workers	 in	 the	
country-industry	of	reference.	The	same	countries	are	included	as	in	Figure	7A.	Country-industry	
cells	 having	 less	 than	 25	 observations	 in	 PIAAC	 are	 excluded	 to	 reduce	 measurement	 error.	
Standard	 errors	 are	 clustered	 at	 the	 home	 country	 -	 partner	 country	 level.	 A	 missing	 value	
indicates	that	the	regression	coefficient	is	insignificant	at	5%	confidence	level.	 	 	 	
Source:	Grundke	et	al.	(2017a)	based	on	OECD	PIAAC,	TiVA,	SNA,	ANBERD	data,	WIOD	and	CEPII	
data.	
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intermediate inputs to) manufacturing goods, and do not appear as much 
in gross export statistics as a consequence. Furthermore, Grundke et al. 
(2017a) also show that in all industries cognitive skills, ICT skills, 
management and communication skills and readiness to learn have a 
significant positive effect on productivity and forward integration into 
GVCs, irrespective of the idiosyncratic characteristics of each industry. 
A second analysis exploits the skills indicators above to describe how 
the skill composition of a country’s workforce shapes the patterns of 
specialisation in GVCs. Grundke et al., 2017b test the theoretical 
predictions of two models (Ohnsorge and Trefler, 2007, and Bombardini et 
al., 2012) which investigate the effects of countries’ skills distribution on 
industry specialisation and international trade flows. 
Empirical studies assessing the determinants of comparative advantage 
have so far considered skills as a single dimension, usually measured in 
terms of educational attainment, and maintained that human capital 
differences across countries are based on aggregate or average skills. This 
entailed ignoring the underlying distribution of skills in the workforce. 
Bombardini et al.'s (2012), on the contrary, show empirical results that the 
within-country dispersion of skills matters for industry specialisation in 
international trade. Ohnsorge and Trefler’s (2007) theoretical model 
focuses instead on the importance of a mix of various skills at the worker 
level (the skill bundle) and of the country-wide joint distribution of skill 
bundles for countries’ comparative advantage in international markets. 
Grundke et al. (2017b) finds empirical support for both these economic 
relationships, taking a trade-in-value-added perspective and analysing 23 
OECD and non-OECD countries. It shows that, for international trade, 
skill bundles matter much more than individual skills. For instance, ICT 
industries benefit especially from bundling quantitative or STEM skills 
with communication and team-working skills. Grundke et al. (2017b) also 
highlights that the distribution of skills, both when taken singularly and in 
bundles, is an important determinant of a country’s specialisation and 
performance in GVCs. While the wealth of estimated results makes it 
impossible to give an appropriate account of all combinations of skills and 
related paths of GVC specialisation here, Grundke et al. (2017b) show that 
two countries with similar average skill endowments may end up 
specialising in different industries and may position themselves at 
different production stages along GVCs, depending on the way skills are 
bundled in the workforce. 
Taken together, the results presented in the two skills-related analyses 
discussed above highlight the existence of strong relations between the 
international fragmentation of production and skills, whether these are 
intended as (i) averages of different types of skills in the industry; (ii) 
bundles of different skills; or (iii) the distribution of single skills or of 
bundles of skills in the industry and country. Education and skill policies 
should therefore acknowledge the importance of all these aspects, when 
considering how they can sustain the integration of a country in GVCs. 
GVCs are creating new opportunities and challenges for skills 
development. For countries to better integrate into and benefit the most 
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from their connection to international production networks, education 
policies should aim at equipping all citizens with literacy, numeracy and 
problem-solving skills, as well as ICT skills, managing and 
communication skills and a general readiness to learn (see Grundke et al., 
2017a, for more details on these results). This in turn calls for the need to 
guarantee the quality of general education, throughout the lifetime of 
individuals, the removal of barriers to access education and life-long 
learning, and improvements in the recognition of skills. 
Advanced education programs should help students develop both 
subject-specific skills and creativity, critical thinking, and communication 
skills. Policies focusing only on selected specific skills rather than bundles 
of skills may reduce the ability of countries to appropriate the benefits of 
GVC participation. This may require, among others, adapting the 
curricula in tertiary education to combine the teaching of cognitive and 
soft skills. 
Insofar as the development of bundles of skills makes workers more 
flexible in their learning and activation of skills on the job, these policies 
would enhance workers’ mobility across occupations and sectors of the 
economy. Mobility is fundamental to reduce the cost of the displacement 
caused by offshoring and import competition. Rethinking public support 
to vocational education and training and assessing the results obtained 
would help understand whether the resources were spent efficiently and 
reached the most appropriate targets. Special attention should be given to 
the training of unskilled workers, who seemingly face the highest risk of 
displacement but are usually the least likely to receive training. Also, 
strengthening the recognition of the skills that workers acquire on the job 
(often informally) would help raise mobility, albeit at the price of a higher 
risk of possible poaching of a firm’s employees by a competing firm. 
Life-long learning and training should target the skill needs required by 
the evolutions of a country’s production structure. Policies targeting the 
development of a given industry can be inefficient and reduce a country’s 
comparative advantage if skills do not match the requirements of the 
industry. As a consequence, effort should be put in understanding and 
anticipating the skills required in production, and how to effectively 
deploy the existing human capital. This, in turn, requires strengthening 
the coordination between the private sector and the education system. 
Ultimately, the different branches of government should come together, 
too. For instance, sound education and life-long learning policies may not 
boost productivity and trade if firms are hindered in their experimentation 
and innovation efforts, or lack appropriate managerial capabilities to 
understand the challenges imposed by GVCs and activate the appropriate 
skills as a consequence, point which is further developed in the next 
section. 
4 GVCs and Knowledge Based Capital 
The fragmentation of production across borders demands economic 
agents to review the way they operate. Workers may need to re-train and 
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perhaps change job to avoid unemployment or enhance their careers in a 
labour market where many employers operate on the international 
market. Firms may need to adapt to stronger competition at home, find a 
way to exploit new inputs produced abroad, or evolve to penetrate new 
markets. This in turn calls for the need to increase firms’ capabilities to be 
able adapt to international markets, and to invest in knowledge based 
capital assets. Three types of knowledge-based capital assets are generally 
considered (Corrado et al., 2005): computerised information (software and 
databases); innovative property (R&D, copyrights, designs); and economic 
competencies (including brands and advertising, firm-level training, and 
organisational know-how). 
4.1 The trade and KBC nexus in the literature 
Multiple aspects of investment in KBC can be related to an industry’s 
performance in GVCs. These include upgrading the quality of products, 
creating value in upstream activities such as new concept or product 
development, as well as engaging in downstream activities related to 
bringing products onto markets such as marketing, branding or customer 
service (OECD, 2013a and 2013b). A number of existing studies have also 
estimated the positive contribution of knowledge-based capital deepening 
to labour productivity (e.g. Corrado et al., 2013) and OC and ICT in 
particular (Bresnahan et al., 2002; Bloom et al., 2012). While the arguments 
proposed here can apply to many KBC assets, for analytical purposes the 
contribution below focuses on investment in organisational capital (OC) in 
particular, i.e. on investments in firm-specific human capital which affects 
the medium and long-term functioning of firms7. 
Better organisational capabilities, especially if coupled with a better 
communication infrastructure, can enhance firms’ ability to co-ordinate 
with and monitor suppliers, integrate inputs of different quality or 
technological content into production, and better match workers with 
tasks in production (e.g. Bloom et al., 2016). Outsourcing and offshoring of 
intermediate inputs, in turn, can stimulate investment by providing access 
to greater variety of inputs, by reducing costs and freeing resources for 
investment, or by increasing the pace of reallocation across agents within 
                                                
7 Other recent OECD work provided a new methodology to estimate industry 
investment in another KBC asset, firm-based training, for a number of OECD 
countries for 2011 (Haskel et al., 2016). However, data availability requirements make 
it impossible to develop a reliable time series of investment, which is instead 
necessary for the analysis in Marcolin et al. (2018b). 
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and across sectors, thanks to competition (e.g. Bloom et al., 2015; CAE, 
2015)8. 
Such mutually reinforcing dynamics between KBC investment and 
upstream integration can be dampened by the possibility that in-house 
production is downsized in favor of production elsewhere, to such an 
extent that also investment in KBC gets ultimately reduced at home. 
 
4.2 KBC-GVC, a two-way relationship? 
Marcolin et al. (2018b) shed light on these complex dynamics by 
exploring for the first time the double direction of causality linking 
investment in software and organisational capabilities (OC) to the degree 
of sourcing of inputs from domestic and foreign suppliers, for both service 
and manufacturing industries. The analysis, which encompasses 25 OECD 
countries and 26 non-agriculture industries for the period 2000-11, uses 
measures of backward linkages from the WTO-OECD Trade in Value 
Added dataset and the underlying Inter-country Input-Output (ICIO) 
tables. 
Investment in OC captures the amount that industries devote to the 
compensation of workers whose occupations are intensive in managerial 
and organisational tasks, based on new cross-country information on 
workers’ task on the job contained in the OECD PIAAC survey 
(methodology in Le Mouel et al., 2016)9. 
The new OC investment data estimated in panel format in Le Mouel et 
al., 2016 reproduces a well-established fact, i.e. that communication and 
                                                
8 The analysis of the relationship between KBC investment and forward linkages is not 
covered by the project at this stage. Previous OECD work (OECD, 2013a and 2013b) 
provided evidence of the correlation between KBC stocks in selected OECD countries 
and value added of exports. 
9 The concept which is here denoted as organisational capital has been defined in a 
variety of ways in previous studies, even when focusing on managerial and human 
resource practices more narrowly. For a review of measures of organisational capital 
and managerial capabilities, see for instance Bloom et al. (2014). In Marcolin et al. 
(2018b) OC is defined as the firm-specific human capital performing tasks such as: 
developing objectives and strategies; organising, planning and prioritising work; 
building teams, matching employees to tasks, and providing training; supervising and 
coordinating activities; and communicating across and within groups to provide 
guidance and motivation (after Le Mouel et al., 2016). The sample is restricted to 
selected European countries and the U.S. because constructing panel estimates of 
investment in OC requires the availability of matrices of employment by 
disaggregated sector and occupations, in internationally comparable classifications. 
Access to such data is limited at present. 
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information capabilities in an industry are complementary to 
organisational capabilities (Figure 8). Firms’ and industries’ productivity 
returns to ICT investment are greater when firms are able to adjust the 
production structure to the new information and communication 
infrastructure. Marcolin et al. (2018b) show that this relationship holds, at 
a descriptive level, when the concept of ICT is extended to include not 
only tangible equipment but also software investment and purchases of 
intermediate ICT services. 
Marcolin et al. (2018b) show that investment in OC and software is 
complementary to offshoring, in net value added terms, once changes in 
labour productivity, tangible investment, employment and cost of 
employees are accounted for. Such a complementarity, to be intended as 
the ability of each activity to increase the return to the other, may arise out 
of firms' improved ability to absorb exogenous shocks, to match workers 
with technology, and to adapt production processes - especially if 
offshored inputs are of different quality or technological content than 
domestic production. 
Greater offshoring of inputs, in turn, may further enhance investment 
in OC and software through channels such as greater foreign competition 
on the input market, or by requiring more coordination and flexibility, or 
by raising the technological content of production. 
 
Figure	8.	Correlation	of	2000-2010	Growth	in	OC	Investment	and	in	ICT	 	
(a)	ICT	hardware	
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(b)	ICT	software	
	
Note:	Dots	 represent	 industry-country	pairs.	Dots	coloured	 in	dark	blue	 refer	 to	manufacturing	
industries,	those	in	light	blue	to	services.	ICT	hardware	includes	investment	(SNA)	and	purchases	
of	ICT	from	ISIC	rev.3	industries	30,	32,	33.	ICT	software	includes	investment	(SNA)	and	purchases	
of	ICT	services	from	ISIC	rev.3	industry	72.	All	figures	are	net	of	the	purchases	of	ICT	inputs	by	the	
sectors	30,	32,	33	and	72.	 	 	
Source:	Marcolin	et	al.	(2018b)	based	on	PIAAC,	EU	LFS,	SES,	CPS,	SNA,	and	ICIO	data.	
 
On the one hand, backward linkages with international markets may 
provide access to the frontier of knowledge in the sector. On the other 
hand, KBC investment may help spreading and embedding this 
knowledge into domestic production. 
The analysis thus suggests that KBC investment and GVC integration 
may be reinforcing each other. This should not be surprising in light of the 
extensive literature linking productivity, KBC investment and GVC at the 
firm or at more aggregate levels. The analysis therefore contributes to the 
debate on the dynamics of aggregate productivity in OECD countries. 
From what mentioned above, productivity enhancements within firms can 
stem from the ability of KBC investment to generate and diffuse ideas, 
some of which are embodied in inputs provided by the production chain 
or are stimulated by increased competition in the input market. But KBC 
investment and GVC linkages can also impact the reallocation of resources 
between best and worst performing firms, and aggregate productivity as a 
consequence (e.g. Bloom et al., 2015). 
The analysis in Marcolin et al. (2018b) stresses one of the positive 
returns to outsourcing and offshoring, i.e. that they can stimulate the 
economy’s investment in knowledge based capital assets. In order for this 
specific channel of gains from internationalisation to materialise, firms 
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should be able to invest in knowledge according to their preferred 
business strategy. 
On the one hand, this may call for enhanced market competition and 
for the removal of barriers to the free allocation of labour and capital 
among firms. Product market reforms enabling more rapid diffusion of 
technology and information, and increased incentives for firms to 
innovate and adapt production to the international market may be helpful 
in this respect. These framework conditions may be especially important 
in light of the complementarity between KBC investment and the GVC 
integration highlighted above, as the latter may strengthen 
winner-takes-all dynamics and increase market power in case only few 
firms are able to innovate and exploit the benefits of international 
integration. A fair integration in GVCs should not produce a market 
dominated by few firms able to extract most of the consumer surplus, 
block entry of competitors and weaken the process of creative destruction. 
On the other hand, policy may want to broaden its efforts in support of 
the creation and diffusion of knowledge. For overall KBC assets, this 
implies considering which mechanisms enhance the recognition and 
assessment of the intangible asset by the market (without risking to reveal 
strategic information), as well as what taxation design is best suited to 
stimulate investment. Similar conclusions are drawn in OECD (2013b) 
which investigated KBC more broadly and the links with forward GVC 
participation in particular. What is more, financial market reforms may 
facilitate new technology-based entrepreneurial initiatives. Policy makers 
could also focus on how to endow the workforce with the necessary skills, 
and in particular entrepreneurship skills and managerial capabilities, 
which both support the diffusion and absorption of new technologies, and 
help firms adapt to the challenges of production in an international 
production chain. 
The case for coordination among different branches of policy making, 
already mentioned above, should be made here even more strongly. As 
KBC investment enhances the ability of the economy to create and absorb 
knowledge, innovation, skill and trade policies should be jointly declined 
(to the extent possible), in order to maximise the benefits of participating 
in international production chains. When evaluating whether to further 
liberalise trade and investment, OECD countries should consider the 
possible gains in terms of knowledge creation and absorption, too. 
Similarly, it should not come as a surprise if incentives to innovation and 
investment in knowledge raise a firm’s propensity to split its production 
process across borders. 
5 Conclusions  
This paper proposes a synthesis of different streams of analysis 
investigating the role of GVCs in shaping demand for labour and skills in 
OECD countries. While evidence suggests that the international 
fragmentation of production has benefitted OECD countries in the 
aggregate, it has left parts of society behind, also due to the insufficient 
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attention paid to redistribution issues. Combined with other market 
failures like rigidities in input and product markets, credit market 
imperfections, and dynamics related to the pace of technological change, 
integration in GVC has in some cases contributed to lower the working 
and living conditions of parts of the population. 
Responding to these societal challenges and allowing the benefits from 
globalisation to both materialise to the greatest extent and be distributed 
equitably, OECD countries should activate or step up actions in multiple 
policy making areas. Key ones concern education and life-long learning, to 
bring back people and their skills at the centre, for society as a whole to 
gain from this form of globalisation. While it is unlikely that any policy 
may influence features like the degree of computerisation of employment 
directly, improvements in the way pupils and workers are prepared to the 
challenges jointly raised by GVCs and technological change would 
enhance workers’ ability to integrate in the labour market, perform and 
transit successfully between jobs, if needed. Life-long learning initiatives 
should bear in mind that while general cognitive and ICT skills are very 
important for employability and performance, so are non-cognitive skills. 
Also, the evidence generated the importance of skill bundles for industry’s 
performance, i.e. the need that each and every worker is endowed with 
more than one set of skills, for firms to thrive in GVCs. 
Strengthening the entrepreneurial skills and managerial capabilities of 
the population should enhance the firms’ and industry’s ability to adapt to 
the challenges of international production chain, and to better cope with a 
constant need to generate and embed technological advances in 
production processes. 
Well-functioning labour market institutions are also important to 
enhance the reallocation of the labour force and thus maximally benefit 
from participation and positioning in GVCs. Active labour market policies 
coupled with workers’ training can help address the match between 
workers and firms, and allow for a smooth transition between occupations 
and sectors, as well as between self-employment and salaried 
employment. The challenging transitions between occupations and sectors 
may further require updates in the design of social protection, e.g. by 
making entitlements portable from job to job, or by amending collective 
agreements or minimum levels of employment protection of workers. 
As GVCs facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and technology across 
countries and sectors, and the evidence provided in this project stresses 
the importance of innovation for job creation, policy makers may want to 
broaden their efforts in sustaining the creation and diffusion of 
knowledge. This calls for new approaches to science, technology and 
innovation policies, as well as for the removal of existing barriers to firm 
entry and to the need to re-think competition policy. A fair integration in 
GVCs should not result into markets dominated by few firms able to 
extract most of the consumer surplus, block entry of competitors and 
weaken the process of creative destruction. 
Above all, sound policy approaches to addressing the societal problems 
triggered by globalisation cannot but rely on coordinated policy 
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interventions. For instance, when discussing further trade and investment 
liberalisation, OECD countries should consider, among others, the 
possible gains in terms of knowledge creation and absorption, as well the 
cost in terms of employment reallocation such reforms may impose. Lack 
of consideration of the important spillovers between industrial, 
innovation, labour, trade and skills policies may partially or totally 
invalidate policy actions, and both reduce the aggregate gains from GVCs 
as well as worsen their (re)distribution among different layers of society. 
Lastly, the analyses above suggest that globalisation and technological 
progress are intertwined, and often mutually reinforcing. The progressive 
digital transformation of production in OECD countries is already playing 
and is likely to play an even more important role in the future. Coupled 
with the ongoing progressive globalisation, the digital transformation is 
going to impact economies and societies profoundly, including labour 
markets and skills. This may happen through multiple channels, some of 
which are: knowledge creation and transmission, big data and digital 
trade, also across borders; the convergence of service and goods 
production; and the substitution of physical with digital or intangible 
products and capital. Such transformation increases the urgency of 
coordinated policy actions aimed to make globalisation beneficial for all. 
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